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Abstract
In this note an alternative framework to Selden and Song's (1995) work is proposed in order
to clarify some of their results and verify whether the relationship between pollution
abatement and national income can be drawn as a J curve when there is more than one
country involved. As Selden and Song do, pollution is considered as a flow externality. Their
model is extended to a two country case which requires the use of differential games. The
optimisation problem is decomposed into two stages, the pollution abatement and the
accumulation problem. A J curve for pollution abatement is replicated and a static
comparative analysis confirms that the smaller the rate of discount and/or the less polluting a
technology is, the higher the stock of capital, current expenditure and pollution abatement
will be at the steady state.
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Most of the theories on economic growth implicitly assume that if some
wastes are produced by the economic process they can be disposed of at
no cost to the society. Nevertheless, this assumption is not satis…ed in the
real world. Thus, any theory of optimal economic growth should take into
account these spillover e¤ects. The earliest work dealing with growth and
pollution is Forster’s (1973) model.
Empirical evidence seems to support the fact that environmental quality
declines in the …rst stages of economic growth and it improves once economies
reach a certain degree of development. This behavior might be explained by
factors such as changes in the composition of production and consumption.
That is, low income levels are usually related to a small industrial sector
and, consequently, with low levels of pollution, while emissions of pollutants
increase as industrial activities develop. Nevertheless, this trend may change
once economies reach a high level of income and specialize in service sectors.
Selden and Song (1995) derive this behavior of emissions making a simple
change to Forster’s model.
This note focuses on Selden and Song’s paper and extends the analysis
to a two-country case in order to verify whether the relationship between
pollution abatement and national income can be drawn as a J curve when
pollution is a transboundary problem. Moreover, the two-country model pro-
vides an appropriate setting to study the sources of asymmetries that could
explain the observed di¤erences among abatement e¤orts across countries.
The following section states the model. In Section 3 a J curve for abatement
is derived and Section 4 concludes this note.
2 The Model
The economic process produces goods and services that provide utility to
consumers and wastes that generate certain disutility. Thus, social welfare
depends positively on consumption and negatively on the damage caused by
pollution.
Consider two countries, each one denoted by i =1 ;2, and assume that the
‡ow of gross bene…ts provided by consumption is an increasing and concave
function, Bi (ci(t)), and that marginal bene…ts tend to in…nity as consump-
tion approaches zero. Suppose also that pollution, Pi(t), is more harmful as
1it increases. Thus the damage function, Di (Pi(t)); will have the following
properties: D
0
i (Pi(t)) > 0;D
00
i (Pi(t)) > 0;8Pi(t) ¸ 0; with Di (0) = 0:
Additionally, consider a production function that depends exclusively on
capital and labor. Assuming, for simplicity, a time invariant production
function and a stationary population, the production function can be de…ned
in terms of capital per capita. Suppose then that production is an increasing
and concave function of capital per capita, Fi (ki(t)),w i t hFi(0) = 0:
Since pollution is regarded as a negative externality of production, gross
emissions are positively related to the stock of capital, gi(t)=Gi(ki(t)).F o r
simplicity, we will make the assumption that emissions per unit of output
are constant, gi(t)=Gi (ki(t)) = µiFi (ki(t)),w i t hµi > 0:1
Moreover, suppose that cleaning up activities, de…ned by the function
Ri (ai(t)); become less e¢cient as abatement expenditures increase, so that
R
0 (ai(t)) > 0;R
00
i (ai(t)) < 0;8ai(t) ¸ 0 with Ri(0) = 0: Additionally,
following Selden and Song, assume that lim
ai!0 R
0
i (ai(t)) = °<+1: This
assumption incorporates corner solutions to Forster’s model.
Assume also that net emissions, Pi(t), are additively separable into gross
emissions, gi(t), minus the reduction in pollution that depends on the amount
of abatement expenditures, ai(t), and ignore (without loss of generality) the
fact that the natural environment absorbs certain amount of pollution. That
is, Pi (ki(t);a i(t)) = gi(t) ¡ Ri (ai(t)).
In most cases pollution is a global or transboundary problem involving
interactions between countries. In the acid rain case, for instance, winds
transport a percentage, ¾i, of pollutants emitted by each country, Pi,t oi t s
neighbor. Thus, the ‡ow of emissions in country i will be Ãi[gi ¡ Ri (ai)] +
¾i [gj ¡ Rj (aj)],w h e r eÃi =1¡ ¾i:2 Hence, the marginal abatement cost
f o re a c hc o u n t r yd e p e n d so ni t so w na b a t e m e n tl e v e l ,w h i l ee a c hc o u n t r y ’ s
marginal abatement bene…t depends on world-wide abatement.
Finally suppose that preferences, technologies and natural environments
a r ee x a c t l yt h es a m ei nb o t hc o u n t r i e s .
1This assumption is the unique change regarding Selden and Song’s (1995) model and
it does not a¤ect the results concerning the J curve for abatement. In their paper Selden
and Song assume that G
00
i (ki(t)) ¸ 0.
2Subscripts referring time have been omitted to simplify notation.
23 The J curve for abatement
Consider that countries do not cooperate and each government chooses time
paths for abatement and capital in order to maximize the present discounted
value of welfare for an in…nite time horizon, taken the time path of the other
country net emissions, Pj = gj ¡ R(aj),a sg i v e n . 3
Alternatively, the optimization problem can be decomposed into two
states. The …rst one is a static problem that establishes the optimal al-
location rule to consumption or abatement at each period. The second one is
a dynamic problem that determines the optimal level of current expenditure,
ei = ci + ai.
In order to choose the optimal expenditures on abatement, each country
solves the following problem:
max
ei¸ai¸0 u(ai)=Bi (ei ¡ ai) ¡ Di[Ãi(gi ¡ Ri (ai)) + ¾iPj]
Lemma 1 An interior solution, a¤
i = ai(ei;g i;P j); to the abatement problem

















¢ > 0;d a i=daj = ¡R
0



















i > 0 and subscripts denote partial derivatives.
Moreover, the marginal willingness to pay for abating pollution can be de…ned




The necessary and su¢cient conditions that the amount of abatement
expenditures must satisfy to maximize welfare are:
B
0
i (ei ¡ ai) ¸ ÃiD
0
i [Ãi (gi ¡ Ri (ai)) + ¾iPj]R
0
i (ai);a i ¸ 0;8i =1 ;2: (1)
This condition implicitly de…nes the optimal value of expenditures on
abatement. For ai > 0, condition (1) holds with equality and, by applying
the theorem of the implicit function, it is easy to show that each country’s
3The most commonly employed control variables in di¤erential games are open-loop
and feedback strategies. The former are optimal for the original game as speci…ed by
its initial condition, while, the latter are optimal for every subgame evolving from it.
Nevertheless, since feedback strategies are more di¢cult to characterize, this note focuses
on open-loop strategies.
3optimal level of abatement, ai, increases with its current expenditure, ei,
gross emissions, gi; and the other country’s net emissions, Pj, while it de-
creases with the other country’s level of abatement, aj; that is, each country
has incentives to free ride on the abatement e¤orts of its neighbor.
The indirect utility function, de…ned as ui (a¤
i)=vi(ei;g i),h a st h ef o l -
lowing properties: viei = B
0
i > 0, vigi = ¡ÃiD
0
i < 0: Then, the marginal will-




Proposition 1 It is optimal to spend no resources on abating emissions
for small levels of current expenditure. However, there is a critical value,
ei = Ei(gi;P j), from which welfare improves by allocating resources to abate-
ment. Then, the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in damage is an
increasing function of current expenditure and gross emissions.
De…ne ei = Ei (gi) by B0
i (ei)=ÃiD0
i (Ãigi + ¾iPj)R0
i (0): This condition
speci…es the boundary of a range of values of gross emissions and current
expenditure for which the solution to the above optimization problem is
a¤
i = ai (ei;g i)=0 : As far as marginal damage is an increasing function
in gross emissions and marginal bene…ts decrease as consumption increases,
Ei (gi) is a strictly decreasing function in gross emissions or, equivalently,
in capital per capita. In the region below and on this function abatement
expenditures are equal to zero, otherwise, ai (ei;g i) > 0:
For ei >E i (gi) we have that miei = ¡(1=R0
i)R00




Proposition 2 Current expenditure and capital increase until reaching their
steady state values.
Once the optimal level of abatement has been chosen, the control variables
of the accumulation problem reduce to one, so that each government has to






¡½itvi (ei;µ iF (ki))dt;
s:t:
¢
k = F (ki) ¡ ±iki ¡ ei;k i (0) = k0 ¸ 0;
where ½i denotes the discount rate and ±i the depreciation rate of capital per
capita.




i [ei ¡ ai (ei;g i;P j)] = ¹i; (2)
F
0





ki = Fi (ki) ¡ ±iki ¡ ei: (4)
Thus, the steady state levels of current expenditure and capital are given









i;P j)] = ½i + ±i (5)
e
¤





Regarding the transition to the steady state, the solution to the system
(3)-(4) de…nes the time paths for the costate and state variables. Alterna-
tively, the system can be de…ned in terms of the state and control variables.













(Fi (ki) ¡ ±iki ¡ ei)+1¡ µimi
#
¡ ½i ¡ ±i
)
(7)
The local stability of the steady state can be inferred from the Jacobian

































i ¡ ai (e¤
i;g¤
i)) < 0 and, according to (5), 1 ¡
µimi > 0 and F 0
i (k¤
i) ¡ ±i > 0.T h e n ,jJj < 0 and the steady state is locally
stable. It is easy to see from (4) and (7) that the stable path has a positive
slope. (See Fig. 1).
An example of the acid rain problem in Europe is the case of Finland
and the former Soviet Union where, as Kaitala et al. (1992) show, there
4The steady state of this exogenous growth model is characterized by a constant level





5are important asymmetries between the two a¤ected areas concerning the
coe¢cients of transportation, damage and abatement functions, etc. In this
note the e¤ect of di¤erences in the discount rate and the technology of pro-
duction on the steady state value of capital per capita, current expenditure
and abatement is analyzed.
Proposition 3 The country with the smallest temporal rate of discount and/or
the less polluting technology will be characterized by the highest steady state
levels of capital per capita, current expenditure and abatement.
Changes in the rate of discount, ½i, and/or the technology used to produce
…nal goods and capital, de…ned by the parameter µi, will a¤ect the steady
state levels of capital and current expenditure.
By di¤erentiating (5) we get dk¤
i=d½i =1 =¦ and dk¤











































i > 0: Moreover, dei=dki = F
0
i ¡ ±i > 0, dgi=dki =
µiF
0













The …rst term of ¦ is clearly negative. Regarding the second term, on the
one hand, an increase in the stock of capital increases the marginal willingness
to pay for abating pollution by increasing current expenditure and gross
emissions but, on the other hand, it reduces the marginal willingness to pay
for abating pollution by reducing pollution in the other country. That is,
as the reaction functions for abatement expenditures have a negative slope,
a higher steady state stock of capital for country i will increase the level of
abatement expenditures of country j and, as a result, net pollution Pj will
decrease. Notice, however that, miPj =( ¾i=Ãi)migi <m igi (if we make
the reasonable assumption that Ãi >¾ i)a n djdPj=dkij < jdgi=dkij because
0 <¾ j=Ãj < 1, 0 <a jgjR
0
j < 1 and 0 < 1 ¡ aigiR
0
i < 1.T h u s ,¦ < 0 and
dk¤
i=d½i < 0, dk¤
i=dµi < 0: Graphically, the locus (6) does not depend on
parameters ½i and µi while the locus (5) shifts to the right as either ½i or µi
decreases.
Countries that care about future generations have a low rate of discount
so that, as they are patient, they will reach a steady state characterized by
5Notice that 0 < 1 ¡ R
0
i (:)aigi < 1 for i =1 ;2:
6a higher level of capital and current expenditure. Thus, since expenditures
on abatement are positively related to capital and current expenditure, the
steady state level of abatement will also be higher. Similarly, the optimal
steady state stock of capital is higher for countries that use cleaner tech-
nologies. Since the amount of gross emissions generated from each unit of
capital is smaller, it is possible to reach the optimal level of pollution with a
higher stock of capital per capita. Furthermore, a higher stock of capital per
capita will be related with higher steady state levels of current expenditure
and abatement.
4 Conclusions
It has been shown that for low levels of current expenditure and capital it is
optimal to care exclusively about economic growth and postpone cleaning ac-
tivities. However, once a certain level of income is reached, welfare increases
by reallocating resources to pollution control. Expenditures on abatement
have been proved to be an increasing function of gross emissions and cur-
rent expenditure. Moreover, current expenditure and capital increase along
the time path to the steady state and, consequently, abatement expenditures
also increase with income. Therefore, a J curve for abatement has been repli-
cated. A static comparative analysis has con…rmed that the smaller the rate
of discount and/or the less polluting a technology is, the higher the steady














Steady state and stable path.
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